A recurring criticism of U.S. bank supervisors is that their standards vary procyclicly with banking and economic conditions. Academic studies of the causes of U.S. banking crises report lapses in bank oversight caused by a pre-crisis period of greater risk tolerance by supervisors. Conversely, post-crisis periods are marked by bankers' claims of overzealous supervision and tightening of supervisory standards. The 2010 reforms of supervisory standards for bank capital adequacy and liquidity (Basel III) directly address procyclicality in supervision and its effects on credit cycles.
Introduction
The global financial crisis that began in early 2007 is still ongoing in 2011. 1 While some countries' economies show signs of recovering in 2011, most are experiencing aftershocks. This regulatory regime change, like all others, raises questions about the motivations for and efficacy of reforms. This paper addresses two of these questions. First, are Basel III reforms of capital and liquidity standards well motivated? Second, how might bank supervisors integrate Basel III into their existing supervisory frameworks? To answer these questions we 1 The U.S. experienced the largest number failed and assisted banks in 2010 (157) since 1990 (169). Most of these failures involved small, community banks that had taken on excessive concentrations of poorly underwritten commercial and residential real estate loans.
2 Examples of aftershocks are the widespread legal irregularities that have arisen with recent mortgage foreclosures and hindrances to problem loan workouts in the U.S., continued uncertainty surrounding credit markets globally, and increasing concern about many countries' (e.g., Ireland, Greece, and Eastern Europe generally) ability to service sovereign debt.
examine the historical relationships between banks' financial condition, local macroeconomic conditions and supervisory assessments of overall bank safety and soundness. We review the literature of banks' conditions and supervisory risk assessments in section 2. We use the relationships between banks' conditions, economic conditions and supervisory risk assessments in section 3 to develop a Ratings Rule Model that mimics U.S. bank supervisors' risk assessments of banks. More specifically, we develop a Ratings Rule Model intended to mimic supervisors' evaluations of banks' overall safety and soundness. The dependent variable of the Ratings Rule Model-composite safety and soundness (CAMELS) rating-is an ordered integer value varying between 1 (best rating) and 5 (worst rating) and, hence, the most appropriate statistical technique for explaining CAMELS ratings is ordered logistic regression. The explanatory variables in the Ratings Rule Model are financial measures of bank capital adequacy, asset quality, earning strength, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk (hereafter, CAMELS attributes), as well as measures of local macroeconomic conditions. In section 4 we use the results of estimations of the Ratings Rule Model to determine the impact of changes in the model's explanatory variables on banks' safety and soundness. Our empirical technique allows us to infer changes in marginal benefit (improvement in safety and soundness) from additional capital and liquidity during stressful and non-stressful periods for banks. In section 5
we compare and contrast the historical evidence on supervisory risk assessments with the Basel III standards and discuss options for integrating Basel III into the current U.S. bank supervisory framework. While much research has been devoted to the policy questions discussed in this paper, we believe this is the first study to quantify the separate influences of banking and macroeconomic conditions from supervisory risk tolerances on capital and liquidity requirements under pillar II.
Literature Review
The question of whether bank supervisors' standards change with banking and economic conditions has been frequently discussed by market participants and policymakers.
There has been little rigorous research on the topic, however, due in large part to the confidential nature of supervisory ratings. In addition, all federal and state bank regulators typically only have access to the supervisory ratings they issue. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), however, has access to virtually all commercial bank and thrift examination ratings.
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Two recent studies -Curry, Fissel and Hanweck (2007) and Krainer and Lopez (2009)- investigate cyclicality in supervisory standards for multibank bank holding companies; specially, the examination ratings issued to the top tier holding company organization. 5 Curry, Fissel and Hanweck (2007) Curry, Fissel and Hanweck (2007) , loosening of supervisory standards is associated with over prediction of rating downgrades when transitioning from weak to strong economic periods. Conversely, tightening of supervisory standards is associated with over prediction of rating upgrades when transitioning from strong to weak economic periods. Their assumption is that since the downgrade model is fitted with data from one period, out-ofsample forecasts for the next period can be used to detect changes in examiner risk weights or regression model coefficients. Curry, et al. also include time trend indicators in their rating change models as an additional test of changing standards.
supervisors' examination ratings and banks' criticized assets. 7 Their approach is fundamentally the same as that used in the more recent studies by Curry, Fissel and Hanweck (2007) and Krainer and Lopez (2009) that rely on comparisons of prediction models to outcomes and tests of model intercept changes. Berger, et al. state that they find some evidence of tightening supervisory standards during stressful market periods (1989 -2002) and loosening of standards during expansionary economic periods (1993 -1998) Potentially important missing variables these three papers discuss include measures of changes in banking market structure and regulation.
The empirical literature on the conditions of banks, especially their capital shortfalls, and the repercussions of bank conditions on lending and real economic activity grew dramatically following the bank "capital crunch" of the early 1990s. Bank capital shortfalls can stem from increases in loan losses, higher regulatory capital requirements and increased risk aversion at banks. Generally, studies have found that capital shortfalls reduce banks' lending and that reduced lending, in turn, reduces economic activity. Bernanke and Lown (1991), Peek and Rosengren (1995) , Wilcox (1994, 1998) , and Pennacchi (2005 Pennacchi ( , 2006 , along with several others, document the depressing effects on U.S. banks' lending and on real economic activity that resulted from shortfalls of bank capital.
7 For example, Berger et al. use a methodology developed by O' Keefe and Dahl (1996) in which examination ratings are forecast in a two-step selection model with corrections for potential selection bias. In O' Keefe and Dahl (1996) the likelihood of a bank being examined is modeled as a probit regression and examination ratings are modeled as an ordered logit regression that includes the inverse Mills ratio as a control of selection bias.
CAMELS ratings are broader measures of bank condition than equity capitalization, and have been the subject empirical research similar to that on bank equity capital. There have been fewer studies of the causes and effects of bank CAMELS ratings, however, primarily because CAMELS ratings are not publically available. Cole and Guenther (1998) show that recently assigned CAMELS ratings improve (statistically significantly) forecasts of bank failures. De Young et al. (1998) conclude that CAMELS ratings help forecast yields on banks' bonds. Berger and Davies (1998) conclude that supervisors' ratings tend to reflect otherwise-private information, which subsequently came to be known and was then reflected in banks' equity share prices. Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) report that, in forecasting future performances of bank holding companies, supervisors' recently-assigned ratings tend to outperform forecasts that were based on capital market prices. O' Keefe et al. (2003) and O'Keefe (2010) provide evidence that supervisors' ratings of the caliber of loan underwriting standards forecast future nonperforming assets and loan charge-offs. And Bennett et al. (2008) show that the worse its CAMELS rating, the more likely a bank became troubled and failed. Taken together, these studies suggest that on-site exams and supervisors' ratings provide information about banks beyond that already captured by contemporaneous bank financial statements or by banks' bond yields and share prices.
Conversely, several studies examine the extent to which banks' future conditions, as indicated by their CAMELS ratings, could be forecast by bank financial statement data and other readily available data. Collier et al. (2003) show that banks' future conditions, and in particular CAMELS-rating quarter. In subsequent sections we use these estimated relationships to learn how supervisory standards and market conditions influence ratings.
Our Ratings Rule Model accounts for CAMELS ratings with financial data banks file with their primary federal regulator each quarter (hereafter, Call Reports) and data on local economic conditions. The model is designed to approximate the CAMELS ratings that banks are likely to receive when they receive an on-site safety and soundness examination and are assigned CAMELS ratings during the 90 days that follow quarter-end financial reporting dates We exclude from our samples those banks whose Call Reports reported values for the explanatory variables used in equation 1 that were far in the tails of the variables' distributions.
We otherwise include banks of all sizes. Because the data were not weighted by asset size, the few dozen very large, presumably multi-state banks among the thousands of banks in each cross-section estimation sample had very little effect on the estimates. Because each bank was separately examined and rated, we include banks regardless of whether they were part of multibank holding companies.
In addition to the SCOR variables, we also include recent local economic growth, as measured by the first four quarterly lags of the statewide growth rate of economic activity. We approximate that growth rate with the one-quarter growth rate of the each state's coincident Index, which are compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We expect recent local economic growth rates to influence supervisors' judgments, and thus CAMELS ratings, in that they serve as a proxy for information that will likely soon be-but has not yet been-reflected in future Call Reports. Thus, for example, weak economic growth might be correlated with information that is either not readily quantified or not included in the Call Reports. As an illustration, local economic data for local commercial real estate vacancy rates, bankruptcy filing rates, or notices of default would not be in Call Reports but might inform supervisors'
judgments. In addition, there may be some tendency for bank data revisions to be correlated with economic conditions: When the economy weakens, banks may increasingly tend to underreport problems.
Estimates of Bank Supervisors' Ratings Rules
In this section we present the results of our estimations of the Ratings Rule Model. In particular, we focus on the level and trend in the marginal effects of the explanatory variables of the Model and offer explanations for time variation in effects. 
The nonlinear relationships between the explanatory variables and the probability of receiving a particular CAMELS rating means that the marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the probability of receiving a particular CAMELS rating is not given by the logistic regression coefficient vectors, β' t and λ' t . The marginal effect of an explanatory variable on the probability of receiving a particular CAMELS rating is itself a nonlinear function of all explanatory variables and their estimated coefficients, as is shown by the partial derivative of F(z) with respect to an explanatory variable, e.g., equity capitalization, in equation 3. 13 We cannot present estimates of the Rating Rule Model regression coefficients because this information is confidential material about the FDIC early warning system SCOR.
We estimate the marginal effects the explanatory variables in equation 1 on F(z) using alternative assumptions about the values of the explanatory variables as a way to disentangle the influences of banks' conditions, macroeconomic conditions and supervisory standards.
Average Marginal Effects
We begin our analysis of marginal effects by estimating the marginal effect of an 14 Specifically, we estimate mean values of each explanatory variable by CAMELS ratings to account for the potential variation in values by bank condition over time. Importantly, the mean estimates are for banks examined within the next quarter. This latter criterion is used to ensure ratio values are within a range observed by supervisors (examiners) when deciding on CAMELS ratings. The lower and upper values for explanatory variables we observe for "good" and "bad" banks (as indicated by CAMELS ratings) over the approximately 26 year period are used as boundaries in our marginal effect estimates. We should emphasis that our process for identify "reasonable" historical ranges for variables excludes extreme outliers, yet still accounts for cross-sectional and time series variation in variables.
variable on banks' probability of receiving a CAMELS-1 rating for various values of that variable as banks' conditions change over time. To summarize marginal effect estimates we compute the average marginal effect (hereafter, AME) for a variable on the probability of receiving a CAMELS-1 rating across banks each quarter. Changes in AME incorporate the influences of supervisory standards, banks' conditions and local economic conditions on the probability of receiving a CAMELS-1 rating. 15 Variables that have a positive (negative) effect on bank safety and soundness should have positive (negative) AME estimates. Accordingly, we interpret increases in the absolute value of AME over time for a fixed value of a variable as indication of increases in the variable's influence on banks' safety and soundness. Using this same reasoning, we interpret decreases in the absolute value of AME associated with increases in a variable's value at a point in time as indication of eventually diminishing influence on banks' safety and soundness.
We present estimates of average marginal effects using figures. When interpreting figures of the average marginal effect of a variable across values of that variable at a point in time one should keep in mind the logistic function from which average marginal effects are derived. The logistic function is a sigmoid function ("S" shaped function) and has a first derivative function that is bell shaped. As a result, a figure of the average marginal effects of a variable at a point in time will be a bell shaped curve or a segment of a bell shaped curve, 15 We should point out that our AME measure differs somewhat from textbook measures of marginal effects. For comparison, three standard marginal effect measures are the marginal effect at the mean (MEM), marginal effect at representative values (MER) and standard average marginal effect (AME). The MEM and MER measures fix all explanatory variables at specific values, and each produces a single margin effect estimate. Conversely, standard AME measures allow all explanatory variables to be at observed values and an average effect across banks is computed.
depending on the range of values of the variable shown in the figure. 16 In interpreting our results we focus on changes in the curvature and position of average marginal effect curves for a variable over time, as well as differences in the average marginal effect curves at a point in time across explanatory variables.
AME of Equity Capital
Given the amount of attention bankers, their regulators and the public devote to bank capital adequacy, it would be helpful to know how capitalization has influenced bank safety and soundness over prior economic cycles. We begin our analysis by examining trends in the AME of equity during past, as well as the current, U.S. banking crises. Figures 1 through 4 show the AME of equity on the probability of being CAMELS-1 rated in the next quarter during the late 1980s, early 1990s and late 2000s U.S. banking crises. AMEs are estimated in the first quarter of each year in figures 1 through 4. In most periods, the AME of equity increases with capitalization up to a point, then gradually decreases. Figures 1 through 4 suggest that as banking market stress increases (i.e., 1987 -1991 ) the AME of equity curve becomes more concave (less flat) and the peak AME occurs at capitalization rates of 15-to-25 percent, suggesting diminishing marginal benefits for "excessive" capitalization. As the banking crisis deepens (i.e., 1990 -1993) , the peak AME increases as well. Finally, as the crisis abates (i.e., 1993 -1994 ) the process reverses; the AME curves flatten and the peak AME declines. Since figures 1 through 4 all show positive AMEs, there is always a benefit from increased capitalization, but the marginal improvement in safety and soundness typically diminishes above 15-to-25 percent capitalization. Figure 4 shows estimates of the AME of equity for the current banking crisis (2007 -2010) . Interestingly, the AME curves for 2007 and 2008 are nearly flat but become sharply concave in 2009 and 2010. While the peak AME for the most recent crisis is similar to that for the early 1990s banking crisis, the pre-crisis AME curves are much flatter. This latter result is likely due to the fact that the late 1980s banking crisis in the southwestern region of the U.S. The trends in the AME of equity across time and capitalization rates are much as we expected. There are clear indications of increased marginal benefit from higher capitalization during periods of banking market stress but there are also indications that the marginal benefit diminishes at high capitalization rates (15-to-25 percent). Finally, trends in the AME of equity are consistent with the procyclical nature of banks' capital requirements.
Crisis versus Non-crisis Period Interaction Effects
Figures 1 through 5 suggest that equity capital has greater influence on bank safety and soundness ratings during periods of severe banking market stress than during non-stressful periods. In this section we test the statistical significance of such procyclical effects by estimating interaction effects between continuous financial variables of the CAMELS attributes and a discrete, binary variable indicating the presence or absence of a bank market crisis. 
Estimates of Crisis versus Non-crisis Period Interaction Effects
To estimate interaction effects between the bank financial variables and crisis period (hereafter, interaction effects) on the probability of becoming a problem bank for the key financial variables that represent the CAMELS financial attributes and table 9 summarizes our overall findings. As discussed previously, each bank-date observation in the estimation sample will have a separate interaction effect (see equation 6). To summarize our results, we group estimates of interaction effects into five categories, based on banks' estimated probability of being a problem bank: 1.) 0%-to-20%, 2.) 20%-to-40%, 3.) 40%-to-60%, 4.) 60%-to-80% and 5.) 80%-to-100%. 18 To estimate crisis period interaction effects we estimate the Problem Bank Model using panels of data where each panel combines data from one crisis period year-end and one noncrisis period year-end. We define banking crisis periods as the years 1988-to-1992, and 2007-to-2011 (current) . 19 We form several pre-and post-1980s crisis period data panels, as well as data panels for the current crisis. As shown in table 1, our data panels use data during and after the late 1980s and early 1990s banking crisis, and years leading up to the most recent crisis. Table 1 shows estimates of mean interaction effects and Z scores for each bank grouping and data panel. The interaction effects indicate the change in the probability of becoming a problem bank in the ensuing quarter due to the interaction term. As such, a negative (positive) interaction effect means the probability of becoming a problem bank is reduced (increased) by the interaction term. "save" all banks from failure. An analysis of the effect of these and other government support programs on bank examination ratings is beyond the scope of this paper, however. Table 2 presents estimates of interaction effects for loan loss reserves and crisis period dummy variables. As was the case for equity capital, we find in general a negative and statistically significant interaction effect for loan loss reserves for the late 1980s and early 1990s crises, but do not find statistically significant interaction effects for the current crisis. The reason for the lack of significant interaction effects for loan loss allowances for the current financial crisis could also be due to the widespread government support programs for troubled banks.
20 Robustness tests of data panels using the 2008 and 2010 crisis year yielded similar results to those using 2009.
Like equity capital, bank earnings play an important role in supporting bank safety and soundness. We had expected that earnings strength would become even more important to bank safety and soundness during banking crises, potentially reducing the likelihood of becoming a problem bank more so than during non-crisis periods. That is, we expected negative interaction effects for net income and crisis period dummy variables; but table 3 shows this is not the case. Rather, table 3 shows that the interaction effect for net income during the late 1980s and early 1990s varies from negative to positive as banks' probability of becoming a problem bank increases. We interpret this latter result to mean that net income plays a procyclical role for bank safety and soundness for banks that are in generally sound condition but plays a counter-cyclical role for banks that are in generally weak condition. Table 4 presents estimates of average interaction effects for liquid assets and crisis period dummy variables. As expected, we find evidence of procyclical effects during the late 1980s but no statistically significant interaction effects for the late 1990s and current financial crisis. The lack of significant interaction effects for recent years suggests the Basel III reforms to supervisory liquidity standards are well motivated. Table 5 shows estimates of average interaction effects for volatile liabilities and crisis period dummy variables vary from positive to negative during the late 1980s and early 1990s crises. We do not find a pattern in these results and find interaction effects are generally insignificant for most of that period. Interaction effects for volatile liabilities are, in some instances, significant and positive for the current crisis, however, suggesting a weak procyclical effect during the current crisis. Tables 6, 7 and 8 present estimates of average interaction effects for three measures of credit quality-nonaccrual loans, gross loan charge-offs, and loan loss provisions-and crisis period dummy variables. We find the interaction effect for nonaccrual loans (table 6) varies from positive to negative as banks' condition weakens for the late 1980s and early 1990s and is in some instances negative for the current crisis. For gross loan charge-offs and loan-loss provisions (tables 7 and 8) we find consistently negative interaction effects. The results for these credit quality measures are counter-intuitive. We expect instead that all three credit quality measures would have positive, procyclical effects. As is the case for net income, the counter-cyclical effects for the credit quality measures suggest that bank examiners place more emphasis on credit quality during non-crisis periods than during crisis periods. This may be due to their expectation that all banks will experience deterioration of credit quality during periods of widespread economic stress, but that only poorly managed banks run into similar problems during periods of strong economic growth.
For brevity, we do not present results for the remaining Problem Bank Model explanatory variables-past due loans, other real estate owned and loans and long-term securities. Table 9 summarizes our findings for all explanatory variables, however
Marginal Effect at Representative Values
In this section we look more closely at the reasons for changing marginal effects. As shown in equation 3, the marginal effect of a variable on the probability of receiving a CAMELS-1 rating depends on the coefficient vectors, β' t and λ' t , and the vectors for financial and macroeconomic explanatory variables, X t-1 and V t-k , respectively. By holding the financial and macroeconomic variable vectors constant, we can measure changes in marginal effects caused solely by changes in supervisors' risk-weights (β' t and λ' t ) for the explanatory variables. The marginal effect measured at fixed values for all explanatory variables is commonly known as the marginal effect at representative values (hereafter, MER).
We select representative values for regressors as of specific points in time and specific types of banks. To estimate MERs for well-run, sound banks during stressful and non-stressful periods we use the mean values of all financial and macroeconomic explanatory variables for CAMELS-1 rated banks for year -ends 1990 and 2006, respectively. 21 To control for management quality, we also require banks to have a management component rating of 1.
Similarly, to estimate MERs for weak, poorly-managed banks we estimate MERs using mean variable values for CAMELS-3 rated banks with management ratings of 3 as of year ends 1990
and 2006. and 2006, figure 6 shows the trends in equity MERs are nearly identical for crisis and non-crisis period representative values. These MER trends indicate that the majority of the time variation in marginal effects of equity capital for CAMELS-1 rated banks is due to changes in the coefficient vectors, β' t and λ' t , or more intuitively, due to changes in supervisors' risk tolerances.
In addition, the consistency in equity MERs between CAMELS-1 rated banks' representative values for crisis and non-crisis periods suggests a high degree in consistency over time in supervisors' risk assessments within CAMELS rating groups. have influenced risk assessments of generally sound, well-managed banks to a much greater degree than risk assessments of weak, poorly managed banks.
Conclusion: Reconciling Results with Basel III
The marginal effect estimates for the Ratings Rule Model and Problem Bank Model indicate that equity capital has had a greater impact on bank condition and/or received greater supervisory emphasis during past periods of banking market stress than have other performance measures, such as net income. We do not, however, find statistically significant procyclicality in equity standards for the current financial crisis. We expect this latter result is attributable, in part, to the widespread government support programs for banks during the current financial crisis but do not test this hypothesis. Overall, we believe the equity capital results support the conclusion of the G20 and BCBS that Basel II capital standards (pillars 1 and 2) are procyclical. The measures the procyclicality of capital standards that we present are estimates of time variation in marginal effects and support the widely accepted notion of the procyclicality of supervisory standards found by previous studies that use summary measures of supervisory standards. 22 We add to this literature by showing that changing supervisory risk tolerance for capital adequacy has had the greatest influence on the safety and soundness ratings of generally sound, well-managed banks and almost no influence on the safety and soundness ratings of weak, poorly-managed banks.
Basel III mandates for strengthening capital requirements call for higher minimum capital ratios, improvements in the quality of capital (contingent capital requirements) and discretionary use of countercyclical capital buffers by supervisors. These mandates suggest a reversal in supervisors' risk-weightings for equity between stressful and non-stressful economic periods. As our results make clear, risk assessment is contextual. If Basel III mandates for countercyclical capital requirements increase supervisory emphasis on equity during nonstressful economic periods, how should supervisors weight other risks? That is, if supervisors become more alarmed by low equity capitalization during non-crisis periods, will they counterbalance this with decreased emphasis on earnings and asset quality? Or will supervisors maintain the same risk weightings for the CAMELS attributes and effectively discount a large portion of bank equity as, e.g., a regulatory tax for deposit insurance.
A comparison of crisis and non-crisis period marginal effects for the CAMELS attributes shows quantitatively how supervisors might adopt Basel III mandates for equity and liquidity.
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